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Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What's




The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19952
("PSLRA" or "Reform Act") is the single most important piece of
securities legislation passed into law since the Securities Act and
Securities Exchange Act were enacted in 1933 and 1934
respectively.3 The Reform Act had a dual objective. First, it was
passed in an effort to limit so-called securities fraud "strike suits.,
4
* Assistant Professor, Department of Business Law, University of Miami
School of Business Administration
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), codified at scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa; id. §§ 78a-781.
4. Strike suits are defined as "shareholder derivative actions begun with [the]
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These typically have taken the form of class action lawsuits filed by
investors in response to a drop in a stock's value, alleging that a
statement made by an issuer of the security was either false or
misleading Frequently these suits generate substantial settlement
figures, whether or not they have any merit at all.6 So the primary
purpose of the PSLRA was to reduce the number of these types of
suits, and the staggering costs associated therewith for issuers and
ultimately the companies' innocent shareholder-investors.7
hope of winning large attorney fees or private settlements, and with no intention of
benefiting [the] corporation on behalf of which [the] suit is theoretically brought."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See, e.g., description of five suits filed on "Marlboro Friday," the day in
April 1993 when Phillip Morris announced a price cut, which might reduce its
operating results by some 40%. Within five hours of the announcement, the first
of five lawsuits to be set forth that day was on file. And on the next business day,
the following Monday, five more suits were filed by anxious plaintiff's counsel.
Harvey Pitt & Karl Groskaufmanis, The Securities Litigation Reform Act's Safe
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements Would Deter Fraud Suits Against
Companies, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at B4.
In re Phillip Morris Sec. Litig. 872 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
6. Before passage of the Act, some 300 federal securities suits were filed each
year; as many as 93% settled out of court at an average cost of $8.6 million; the
overall cost to corporate America was pegged at $2.5 billion a year. See S. REP.
No. 104-98, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 711; see also Robert
A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the
Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2
(1994) (reporting that some 500-700 class action securities fraud suits were pending
at any one time, the average settlement figure was $10.8 million per suit, and
average cost of litigation was $692,000 per suit); Douglas M. Branson, Running the
Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal, Journey for
Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 27-28 (1996)
(stating that some "professional plaintiffs" represented by a specialized plaintiffs'
bar own small numbers of shares in as many as 800 publicly traded companies);
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 516-517 and 524 (1991) (concluding
that the merits do not matter, defendants settled for roughly 20-25% of the
amount at stake simply to avoid litigation costs); James Bohn & Stephen Choi,
Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 979 (1996) (concluding that "most securities-fraud class
actions are, in fact, frivolous").
7. Testimony about abusive practices heard by the House and Senate
Committees included:
"(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others
whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint
hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action;... (3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs
so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to
settle. .."
Statement of Managers-the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730
[hereinafter Statement of Managers].
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Consequently, the statute includes both procedural and substantive
provisions' designed to discourage the filing of strike suits and,
perhaps more importantly, to give judges the power at an early
stage in the litigation to dispose of those meritless securities fraud
suits that are filed.
Second, recognizing that abusive securities litigation was
"muzzling"9 corporate managers, Congress also sought, through the
Reform Act, to encourage securities issuers to disclose more
information to the investing public. ° Thus the Act immunizes some
issuer statements with a "safe harbor." Corporate managers11 who
utilize the Act's safe harbor can now more candidly disclose their
plans and projections, without fear of providing "grist for the
litigation mill." 2  In brief, the statute provides that as long as
predictive statements are identified as such and accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language, issuers will not be liable for
securities fraud if or when the expected results do not materialize. 3
Ultimately, the Reform Act aims to restore the integrity of the
securities litigation system, promoting efficient creation of capital
while meeting investors' demand for accurate and abundant
disclosure of useful corporate information. Whether it has
succeeded in reducing the number of questionable securities fraud
suits is an open question.14 What we do know is that corporations
8. These include the "safe harbor" discussed infra Section I.B. The most
frequently treated portion of the statute, by the courts and commentators alike, is
its heightened pleading requirements. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d
185 (1st Cir. 1999); In Re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999);
In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v. Chem. Inv.
Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999). See generally Hillary Sale, The
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Heightened Pleading
and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's Internal
Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 537 (1998);
Steven Rosenfeld, Federal Courts Disagree on Pleading Securities Fraud, NAT'L L.
J., Sept. 6, 1999, at B07. Other important provisions include: a stay of discovery
while a motion to dismiss is pending, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); rules for
designating the most appropriate lead plaintiff and for selection of plaintiffs'
counsel, id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i); mandatory Rule 11 inquiry following each case
filed under the Act, id. § 78u-4(c)(1); proportionate rather than joint and several
liability of defendants for defendants who did not act knowingly, id. § 78u-
4(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(B)(i), (f)(10)(B). These are beyond the scope of this article.
9. See Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 42-43.
10. See id. at 32.
11. For a discussion of the safe harbor specifically as it relates to auditor
liability, see Ann Morales, et al. 'Safe Harbor' Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, LXX No 8 CPA JOURNAL 66-68 (2000).
12. Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 43.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c).
14. See, e.g., John L. Latham & Todd R. David, Bears, Bulls and Balance,
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are increasingly drafting their disclosures with the Act's safe harbor
in mind 15 and that the courts are increasingly being asked to
interpret the Act and to use it as a basis to dismiss cases at the
pleading stage.6
B. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
The subject of this article is the PSLRA's most significant
substantive component: a "safe harbor" for that subset of soft
information'7 known as "forward-looking statements." These
include the following types of information: financial projections,
future management plans and objectives, statements of future
economic performance including certain such statements made in
SEC required disclosure documents, as well as any statement of the
assumptions underlying any of the foregoing. 8 Issuers make these
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 22, 1999, at S40; Timothy R. Donovan, New 'Safe Harbor' Is
Not Being Well Utilized, LEGAL TIMES, Jul. 1, 1996, at S29.
15. Several studies have attempted to quantify the effects of the statute on
disclosure drafting. See Committee on Securities Regulation, A Study of Current
Practices: Forward-Looking Statements and Cautionary Language After the 1995
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 53 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 723 (Nov./Dec. 1998); Gerald S. Backman & Richard A.
Rosen, Forward-Looking Statements and Cautionary Language After the 1995
Reform Act: An Empirical Study, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, SAILING IN SAFE
HARBORS: DRAFTING FORWARD LOOKING DISCLOSURES 153-226 (Ferrara, et al.,
co-chairs, 1997).
16. Of sixty-three published district court opinions invoking the safe harbor
provisions of the Reform Act, twelve were decided in 1997, twenty-five in 1998,
and twenty-six in 1999.
17. Soft information is defined as "statements of subjective analysis or
extrapolation, such as opinions, motive, and intentions, or forward-looking
statements, such as projections, estimates, and forecasts." In re Craftmatic Sec.
Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 642 (3d Cir. 1989). See also Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and
Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972) (defining soft
information as
"(1) forward-looking statements concerning the future, such as
projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and
expectations; (2) statements concerning past or present situations when
the maker of the statement lacks the data necessary to prove its
accuracy... ; (3) information based primarily on subjective
evaluations... ; (4) statements of motive, purpose, or intention.. .; (5)
statements involving qualifying words,... for which there are no
generally accepted objective standards of measurement .... ").
18. The statutory definition of "forward-looking statement" is as follows:
A. a statement containing a projection of revenues, income
(including income loss), earnings (including earning loss) per
share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other
financial items.
B. a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future
operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or
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types of disclosures, for example, in reports to shareholders, in
annual and current reports filed with the SEC, in press releases, and
in conference calls with analysts.
Due to their inherently predictive nature, forward-looking
statements are particularly vulnerable to investor-plaintiff
"Monday-morning quarterbacking,"1 9 or the so-called "fraud-by-
hindsight" 20 lawsuit. So, in three specified instances under the Act,21
services of the issuer;
C. a statement of future economic performance, including any such
statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition
by the management or in the results of operations included pursuant
to the rules and regulations of the Commission;
D. any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
E. any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer to the
extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by
the'issuer; or
F. a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as
may be specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1), §§ 77z-2(i)(1).
19. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.
1995).
20. See Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978); Sinay v. Lamson &
Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901
F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1990).
21. The pertinent language creating the safe harbor is as follows:
(c) Safe harbor.
(1) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, in
any private action arising under this chapter [15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq.
and/or 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq.] that is based on an untrue statement
of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make
the statement not misleading, a person referred to in subsection (a)
of this section shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking
statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent that-
(A) the forward-looking statement is -
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary state-
ments identifying important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those
in the forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking
statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual
knowledge by that person that the statement was
false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity;[,] was-
(I) made by or with the approval of an
executive officer of that entity; and
(II) made or approved by such officer with
actual knowledge by that officer that the
statement was false or misleading.
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issuers disclosing forward-looking information will be relieved of
legal liability: first, when such a disclosure is identified as forward-
looking and is accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement" (the
"bespeaks caution" prong);" second, when a forward-looking
statement is deemed to be "immaterial" (the "immateriality"
prong);23 and finally, in any instance where a forward-looking
statement is material but it is either not specifically identified as
forward-looking and/or it is not accompanied by the required
cautionary statements, and the plaintiff is unable to prove actual
knowledge of falsity on the part of the issuer making the statement
(the "actual knowledge" prong).24
This article undertakes to analyze the current status of the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements made by issuers. It is
divided into five parts. Section II addresses the applicability of the
Act. Section III examines pre-Reform Act law briefly, and
compares it with the PSLRA. The heart of the article, Section IV,
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5; Id. § 77z-2 (same).
22. See Section IV.A, infra.
23. This prong has been widely overlooked, but is discussed Section IV.B,
infra.
24. In light of the highly publicized stricter pleading requirements imposed by
the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b) and 78u-4(b), in many cases plaintiffs fail even
to plead with sufficient particularity the "actual knowledge of falsity" required to
prevail on this last prong of the safe harbor. See, e.g., In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Section V.D. infra. Many cases
decided under this part of the statute are based on courts' interpretation of the
new pleading requirements and substantive law of scienter, and in-depth analysis
thereof is outside the purview of this article. For treatment of the new (scienter)
pleading requirements under the Reform Act, see generally Steven Rosenfeld,
Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31
SEC. & COMM. REG. 25 (1998); William S. Lerack & Eric A. Isaacson, Pleading
Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive,
Opportunity, Recklessness and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (1996); Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud
Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675 (1996);
Sherrie R. Savett & Arthur Stock, What to Plead and How to Plead the
Defendants' State of Mind in a Federal Securities Class Action: the Plaintiffs
Perspective, 30 INST. ON SEC. REG. 807 (1998); Ryan G. Meist, Would the Real
Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (1998); Michael B.
Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
or, A Textualist Revenge 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193 (1998); Patricia J. Meyer, Note,
What Congress Said about the Heightened Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution
to the Securities Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (1998). See
also Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
1003, 1023-1028 (1998).
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focuses on the parameters of the first two prongs of the safe harbor
- the "bespeaks caution" prong, and the "immateriality" prong.
There, some conclusions are drawn with regard to what will qualify
as "forward-looking statements" and "meaningful cautionary
statements," as well as what may be considered "immaterial" under
the Act, based on a review of all PSLRA case law. A brief
discussion of the third prong, the "actual knowledge prong" and its
place in safe harbor analysis follows. Section V concludes by
setting forth those rules that can be gleaned from existing PSLRA
case law.
II. Who is Protected for What Statements in Which Transactions?
Not all makers of forward-looking statements are afforded
protection by the safe harbor. Those who are covered are the
securities issuers themselves, " corporate officers, directors or
employees who are acting on behalf of issuers," outside reviewers
retained by issuers to make statements on behalf of issuers" -which
has been taken to include reports by accounting firms, for example"
-and underwriters, when they are making statements based on
information provided by the issuer or information derived from
information supplied by the issuer.29 Brokers' statements, however,
are not protected by the Act's safe harbor.3°
.25. "Issuers" under the Act are defined as those securities issuers who are
"subject to the reporting requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a)(1). In other words, it is
those SEC registrants that are required to file annual, quarterly, and current
reports with the SEC that may qualify for safe harbor treatment. See id. §§ 78m(a)
and 78o(d). The statute does not protect any issuers who within three years of the
statement have violated anti-fraud provision of the securities laws, or who are not
otherwise in compliance with SEC filing and reporting requirements. Id. § 78u-
5(b)(1)(A).
26. See id. § 78u-5(i)(6).
27. See id. § 78u-5(a)(3).
28. Noelle Matteson, Comment, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Do Issuers Still Get Soaked in the Safe Harbor?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 527, 534 n.57 (1997).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a)(4). Some have suggested that this leaves open
whether reports issued after the quiet period by underwriters' analysts are
covered, given that such analysts are not acting on behalf of the issuer and are not
themselves underwriters. See Richard A. Rosen, "The Implications of The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act The Statutory Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking
Statements After Two and a Half Years: Has it Changed the Law? Has it Achieved
What Congress Intended?," 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 645, 648 (1998).
30. The legislative history makes crystal clear that the safe harbor is
inapplicable to statements made by securities brokers. See Statement of Managers,
supra note 7, at 45.
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Likewise, the safe harbor is not applicable to forward-looking
statements made in all types of transactions. Predictive disclosures
that are made in connection with initial public offerings, tender
offers, "going private" transactions, the issuance of penny stocks,
and a number of other inherently risky transactions are excluded
from protection by the Act. 3' The statute also expressly exempts
from its coverage those disclosures made in financial statements
prepared in conformity with GAAP 2
Both oral33 and written forward-looking disclosures are
covered by the Act. To be protected, written disclosures should
contain safe harbor warnings - express language identifying state-
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(1)-(2). The Act's safe harbor also does not apply to
statements made in connection with offerings by blank check companies, offerings
by or statements made in relation to the operations of partnerships, limited
liability companies, and direct participation investment programs, statements
made in connection with rollup transactions, those contained in the registration
statements of investment companies, and in Exchange Act Section 13(d) filings
disclosing beneficial ownership. Id.
32. Id. § 78u-5(b)(2)(A). Two PSLRA cases involving alleged intentional
deviations from GAAP are Gross v. Medaphis Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1463, 1473
(N.D. Ga. 1997); and In re Employee Solutions Sec. Litig., No. Civ 97-545-PHX-
RGS-OMP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16444, at *10 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding that
inaccurate or misleading statements set forth in an issuer's financial statements are
"statements of historical fact," which can not qualify for safe harbor protection
because they are not forward-looking).
33. Section 21E(c)(2) of the Act governs oral forward-looking statements:
(2) forward-looking statement made by an issuer that is subject to the reporting
requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) or
78o(d)], or by a person acting on behalf of such issuer, the requirement set
forth in paragraph (1)(A) shall be deemed to be satisfied-
(A) if the oral forward-looking statement is accompanied by a cautionary
statement-
(i) that the particular oral statement is a forward-looking
statement; and
(ii) that the actual results might differ materially from those
projected in the forward-looking statement; and
(B) if-
(i) the oral forward-looking statement is accompanied by an oral
statement that additional inform-ation concerning factors
that could cause actual results to materially differ from those
in the forward-looking statement is contained in a readily
available written document, or portion thereof;
(ii) the accompanying oral statement referred to in clause (i)
identifies the document, or portion thereof, that contains the
additional information about those factors relating to the
forward-looking statement; and
(iii) the information contained in that written document is a
cautionary statement that satisfies the standard established in
paragraph (1)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(2).
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ments as forward-looking and providing the cautionary language
required by the Act. However, the statute takes a more "flexible"
approach to exempting verbal forward-looking statements.34 To fall
within the safe harbor, oral statements can but need not include the
required cautionary language. Instead, the speaker may simply
advert the listener to specific cautionary language that satisfies the
statute but which is contained in a "readily available written
document" or a portion thereof.35
III. History: the "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine and SEC Safe
Harbor Rules
For those issuers to whom and for those statements to which
the statutory safe harbor applies, its protection is potentially
powerful. But like all statutes, its boundaries necessarily are and
will continue to be defined, inter alia, by the courts' interpretation
of what actually constitutes a "forward-looking statement" and of
what will suffice as "meaningful cautionary language."36  To
understand these, a review of the statute's jurisprudential
underpinnings is in order.
The PSLRA became effective on December 22, 1995. Any and
all suits that had been filed as of that time were not affected by the
new legislation.37 As a result, there is a relative paucity of judicial
opinions specifically interpreting the safe harbor. Nonetheless, we
are not completely without guidance as to how protected forward-
looking statements will be treated by the courts. This is true
because long before the Reform Act was enacted, there was already
an expansive body of judge-made law holding that plaintiffs could
not base securities fraud claims on forward-looking statements if
such statements were accompanied by language that "bespeaks
caution" as to reliance thereupon. The judicially created
"bespeaks caution" doctrine was born in the Eighth Circuit in
1986."9 That doctrine, whose genesis was likely a footnote from as
34. Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 45.
35. See notes 117-122, infra, and accompanying text.
36. As noted previously, the precise contours of the safe harbor will also
continue to be determined by the courts' definition of scienter and the proper
pleading thereof. See note 22, supra.
37. The Reform Act applies to cases filed after December 22, 1995, regardless
of when the allegedly fraudulent statements were made. See, e.g., Wenger v.
Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
38. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 549
(D.N.J. 1992) affd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178, 114 S. Ct.
1219 (1994).
39. See Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986).
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as 1977, 40 has since been adopted by ten41 of the thirteen federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal.42
A. The SEC Safe Harbor Rules
Since 1979, a limited regulatory safe harbor in SEC Rules 175
and 3(b)(6) has been in effect specifically for forward-looking
statements made as part of the required disclosures contained in
reports filed with the SEC.43 Due to their narrow scope, however,
few cases have been decided based on these rules.' Instead, until
the passage of the PSLRA, defendants in securities fraud cases
brought under the '33 and '34 Acts that involved forward-looking
40. See Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977).
41. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1997); Harden
v. Raffensperger Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1404-06 (7th Cir. 1995); Saltzberg v.
TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995); In re Worlds of
Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 909
(1995); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993); Sinay v. Lamson &
Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991); cf Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635,
639 (6th Cir. 1993); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936
F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875,
879 (1st Cir. 1991); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 (8th Cir. 1977).
The Fourth Circuit has declined to adopt the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, opting
for a more restrictive rule. In that circuit, forward-looking statements are not
actionable unless they are worded as guarantees. See Hillson Partners Ltd. v.
Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 218-219 (4th Cir. 1994); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26
F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994); Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir.
1993).
42. Complete treatment of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine is beyond the
scope of this article. However, for a good introduction to it, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Disclosures that 'Bespeak Caution', 49 Bus. LAW. 481 (1994). It
should be noted that the legislative history of the PSLRA unequivocally indicates
that the statutory safe harbor is not intended to replace the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, nor to preclude its further development in the courts. Statement of
Managers, supra note 7, at 46.
43. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c), 240.3b-6(c). These regulations were striking
when promulgated, in that they reversed the SEC's longstanding prohibition on
disclosure of forward-looking statements. See Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362 [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,667 (Feb. 2, 1973). For a more in
depth discussion of the SEC's policy change, see Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the
Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and
Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114
(1987); John M. Olivieri, Note, Liability for Forward-Looking Sta:ements: The
Securities and Exchange Commission's Ambiguous Stance, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 221 (discussing history of change in SEC's practice).
44. See, e.g,. In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 1997);
Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456 (7th Cir. 1993); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F.
Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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statements, usually sought the shelter of the broader "bespeaks
caution" doctrine.
B. The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine
Generally, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine "provides a
mechanism by which a court can rule as a matter of law... that
defendants' forward-looking representations contained enough
cautionary language or risk disclosure to protect the defendant
against claims of securities fraud."45 One circuit court described the
doctrine so: "To put it another way, the 'bespeaks caution' doctrine
reflects the unremarkable proposition that statements must be
analyzed in context."46
In the typical dismissal based on the doctrine, specific
cautionary language is identified, which is found to be "substantive
and tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions
in the [challenged disclosure document]."47 Courts applying the
doctrine then hold either that the cautionary language renders the
forward-looking statements immaterial as a matter of law, or that in
light of cautionary language no reasonable investor would have
relied on the forward-looking statements in the first place.48
C. Comparison to the PSLRA Safe Harbor
Though the "bespeaks caution" doctrine and the statutory safe
harbor are similar in their underlying purpose49 and in the sense
that they both exempt issuers from liability for forward-looking
statements where cautionary language is present, there are
differences between the two. First, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine
is much broader in its application than is the statutory safe harbor.
45. Langevoort, supra note 42, at 482-83.
46. Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1414 (citing Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 167 (5th
Cir. 1994). See also Trump, 7 F.3d at 364 (proposing that "[the doctrine]
represents new nomenclature rather than substantive change in the law.").
47. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371-72.
48. See id. See also Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 167.
49. See Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1415 ("In our view, the bespeaks caution
doctrine helps 'to minimize the chance that a plaintiff with a largely groundless
claim will bring a suit and conduct extensive discovery in the hopes of obtaining an
increased settlement."') (quoting Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d
875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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It applies to a wider range of transactions" and types of statements5'
than does the Reform Act.
And substantively, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine appears to
be supported by numerous rationales. Scholars have noted that
courts applying the bespeaks caution doctrine generally ground it in
terms either of materiality or reliance or a combination of the two.
53
The statutory language itself and the legislative history of the Act
seem to indicate that the safe harbor instead is based entirely on a
materiality analysis.54 In other words, as to the first two prongs of
the statute, forward-looking statements are neutralized - or
rendered immaterial - by sufficient cautionary language, or they are
found to be immaterial on other grounds.
Finally, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine views all forward-
looking statements in their context, to determine whether, based on
the "total mix" of information available to the reader, the forward-
looking statements are shielded from liability because they bespeak
caution.55  The PSLRA's delineation of sufficient cautionary
language is a much brighter line: the statute simply requires the
issuer to identify "important factors that could cause actual results
to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements."56
Thus, though many commentators have generalized that the
Reform Act's safe harbor merely codified the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, in reality the two are not completely coextensive, and it
may be that the Act's safe harbor is more protective within its
domain." Nonetheless, perhaps out of an abundance of caution,
courts have regularly continued to base their decisions, at least in
50. See, e.g, In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp 850 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (initial public offering); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399
(11th Cir. 1995) (private placement); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929
F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991) (limited partnership).
51. See, e.g., Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949
F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991) (financial feasibility study attached to offering materials).
52. See notes 23-30, supra, and accompanying text.
53. But see Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine:
It's Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PITt. L. REV. 619, 630 (1997) (postulating that
there is yet another rationale for the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, occurring when
a court finds that the cautionary language renders the forward-looking statement
not false or misleading).
54. See id.
55. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (quoted in note 21, supra).
57. See Edward Brodsky, Making the Safe Harbor Safer, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10,
1999, at 3. Cf Erin M. Hardtke, Comment, What's Wrong with the Safe Harbor for
Forward-Looking Statements? A Call to the Securities and Exchange Commission
to Reconsider Codification of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
133, 151-153 (1997).
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part, on the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, even in cases to which the
Act applies.58 Circuit Court opinions applying the safe harbor,
though, are beginning to appear with regularity.
IV. Court Interpretations of the Statutory Safe Harbor
As stated previously, the Act's safe harbor consists of three
possible inlets in which forward-looking statements can find refuge.
The first prong is the so-called "bespeaks caution" prong, 9 which
shelters statements that are identified as forward-looking and that
are accompanied by cautionary language. 60 The second is the
"immateriality" prong, which protects those forward-looking
disclosures that can be characterized as "immaterial" as a matter of
law.61  Finally, if a forward-looking statement is neither
accompanied by the requisite cautionary language nor deemed by
the court to be immaterial, its maker still will be insulated from
liability if the plaintiff does not prove the statement was made with
actual knowledge of its falsity.
62
So, at the crux of the PSLRA safe harbor analysis are three
questions. As a threshold matter, what language actually qualifies
as a forward-looking statement? Then, of what does the required
"meaningful cautionary" language consist? And finally, what will
be found to be "immaterial"?
58. Some recent cases that have been decided using a mixture of pre-Reform
and post-Reform Act law include: Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231
(N.D. Cal. 1998); Rasheedi v. Cree Research, Inc., No. 1:96CV00890, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16968 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1997); Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 F. Supp.
1449 (S.D. Fla. 1998); In re ValuJet, Inc. Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (treats safe harbor and "bespeaks caution" doctrines as one and the same).
PSLRA cases decided using "bespeaks caution" doctrine without any safe harbor
analysis include: Cherednichenko v. Quarterdeck Corp., No. CV97-4320-GHK,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1997); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F.
Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal. 1997); In re Grand Casinos Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1273 (D.
Minn. 1997).
59. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (quoted in note 21,supra).
60. If the court finds the statement is forward-looking and is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language, no inquiry is to be made into the defendant's
state of mind. See Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 44. Whether this
creates a loophole for defendants to knowingly make false projections, cloaking
them with cautionary language, is outside the scope of this article. This has been
decried by some. See O'Hare, supra note 53, at 643-44 (quoting statements of
Senators Biden, Boxer, and Sarbanes to the effect that the lack of a good faith
requirement in the safe harbor gives issuers a "license to lie"); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady
Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 989 (1996). For a policy argument in support
of this result, see Rosen, supra note 29, at 657.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii) (quoted in note 21, supra).
62. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (quoted in note 21, supra).
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The statute enumerates the types of predictive statements that
qualify for safe harbor protection, and judicial interpretation to
date has filled in some of the gaps. Vis-A-vis cautionary language,
the statute gives little guidance as to what will qualify as
"meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement." Only a few courts have yet to address
the issue under the PSLRA. And, no court appears as yet to have
utilized the "immateriality prong" per se. Nonetheless, some
general guidelines can still be gleaned from consideration of recent
opinions and from the still viable pre-Reform Act law.
A. The "Bespeaks Caution" Prong of the Safe Harbor
1. What Qualifies as a Forward-Looking Statement?
a. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision in Harris v. IVAX
Corp. -The leading case interpreting what will and will not qualify
as forward-looking is Harris v. IVAX Corp.63 Harris was a class
action suit brought by investors against drug manufacturer IVAX,
its chairman, CEO, and CFO, alleging Rule 10b-5 and Rule 10(b)
violations based on several of the company's press releases. The
first of the press releases acknowledged some setbacks but
expressed optimism. A later press release announced a $179
million loss, the bulk of which was attributable to a goodwill write-
down. Plaintiffs alleged that the failure to include the possibility of
the large goodwill charge in the list of factors that could affect the
first press release's projections (or cause them to be materially
different) amounted to fraud. '
In Harris, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of plaintiff's securities fraud complaint, finding that each
65
of the statements of which plaintiffs complained was forward-
looking and therefore within the ambit of the safe harbor. 66 The
Harris opinion is particularly instructive on this point because it
considered a variety of forms of forward-looking statements. For
example, language of expectation like: "reorders are expected to
63. 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir, 1999).
64. See id. at 802.
65. The Harris court concluded that company communications are to be
examined piecemeal to determine as to each whether the safe harbor applies. See
id. at 804.
66. As to each of the forward-looking statements, the court subsequently
found them to be accompanied by sufficient cautionary language so as to be
shielded from liability under the PSLRA. See id. at 803.
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improve as customer inventories are depleted," according to Harris,
will fall squarely within the statutory definition of a forward-
looking statement. 67 According to the court, this was clearly a
"statement of assumptions upon which" a statement of future
economic performance was based, one of the four specifically
articulated categories of forward-looking information in the Act.'
A more problematic type of statement considered by the
Eleventh Circuit was: "the challenges unique to this period in our
history are now behind us." This statement utilizes the present
tense to convey an anticipatory message 69 but still will be protected,
notwithstanding "purely grammatical argument[s] to the
contrary. 70  In holding that hopeful statements couched in the
present tense are forward-looking, the court said that any statement
about the state of a company "whose truth or falsity is discernible
only after it is made necessarily refers only to future
performance.
71
Finally, the Harris court analyzed what it called a "laundry list"
or "mixed statement" and, in so doing, held that "when the factors
underlying a projection or economic forecast include both assump-
tions [underlying a forward-looking statement] and statements of
known fact, and a plaintiff alleges that a material factor is missing,
the entire list of factors is treated as a forward-looking statement.
7 2
There, an IVAX press release contained a list of factors relating to
its business and which the company said would influence the
upcoming quarter's results. Apparently three of the listed factors
67. See id. at 804. See also In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d
106, 117 (D. Mass. 1999) (characterizing statements like "we expect that full
approval could be granted in the summer months," and "PLC believes its...
application.., is on track for approval this year" as "aspiratory" and therefore
forward-looking under the statute).
68. See Harris, 182 F.3d at 804.
69. Id. at 805The court considered the statement "our fundamental business
and its underlying strategies remain intact .... Only a limited number of
companies are positioned to meaningfully participate in this rapidly growing
market and, among them, IVAX is certainly very well positioned" to be essentially
the same, a "hopeful outlook" stated in present tense terms:
"While it is true that the state of Ivax's 'fundamental business' and
'underlying strategies' is a question of present condition, whether they
are intact is a fact only verifiable by seeing how they hold up in the
future. Likewise, whether Ivax is 'well-positioned' is a statement whose




72. Id. at 807. See also Elhert v. Singer, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
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were clearly statements of historical fact.73 Two others were not.1
4
Plaintiffs alleged that the list was misleading in that it failed to
forecast the possibility of the large goodwill reduction. Since the
argument was that the list itself was misleading by omission, for
purposes of safe harbor analysis, the list as a whole had to be either
forward looking or not. It was, as the court expressed it, a "unit"
for liability purposes."
b. Other Circuit and District Court Opinions-The only
other circuit court opinion so far to analyze disclosures' status as
forward-looking under the Act is In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.
76
There the Third Circuit felt comfortable that the statement "over
the next six months Advanta will experience a large increase in
revenues" fit squarely into the statute's safety net for "projection of
revenues." 77 Likewise, the statement "as [Advanta] converts more
than $5 billion in accounts that are now at teaser rates of about 7%
to its normal interest rate of about 17%" was held to fall under the
statute's protection for "statement[s] of the plans and objectives of
management for future operations, including plans or objectives
relating to the products or services of the isuer. '7 ' Thus, where the
company instead converted accounts to 13% and 14% rates, and
actual knowledge of falsity was not adequately pled, there was no
liability.
79
Lower courts have also considered individual disclosures under
the PSLRA safe harbor. For example, in In re Boeing Sec. Litig8
the court addressed the following disclosure contained in a
company press release:
73. These were: "customer re-orders remain depressed," "prices have contin-
ued to decline," and "a wholesaler customer who owed us approximately $16
million filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition." Harris, 182 F.3d at 806.
74. The statements "we expect reserves for returns and inventory writeoffs to
be well above typical quarters" and "lower prices.., will increase shelf stock
adjustments" were both deemed to be assumptions underlying other predictions
contained in the statement, and therefore forward-looking. Id.
75. Id.
76. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
77. Id. at 536 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(i)(1)(A)).
78. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(i)(1)(B)). See also Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt.
LLC v. Cendant Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 546, 556 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding that
disclosures regarding proposed merger were "plans for future operations" under
this section of the statute); cf. Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene
Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that detailed
representations regarding the expected production levels at mining facilities were
assumed to be forward-looking "statement[s] of the plans and objectives of
manage-ment for future operations").
79. 180 F.3d at 536-537.
80. 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Wash. 1998).
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The rapid production rate buildup has resulted in a substantial
increase in employment, material, and fabrication demand at
the Company and its suppliers. Skill training requirements and
parts shortages have created out-of-sequence work at Company
facilities and at supplier locations. Overtime in engineering and
production areas continues at high levels. As a result, the
commercial aircraft business is experiencing a near-term decline
in productivity. For the longer term, progress continues to be
made in developing and implementing design and production
systems to improve efficiency and reduce cycle times.X
The court broke the disclosure up into three parts. The
statement that the company "is experiencing a near-term decline in
productivity""'-though stated in the present tense-was given the
benefit of the doubt and deemed to be forward-looking "to the
extent Boeing is projecting a near term decline in productivity."83
Likewise, the statement that "longer term progress continues to be
made in developing and implementing systems to improve
efficiency" - though clearly containing both forward-looking and
present tense components-was held to be forward-looking to the
extent it indicated that the company expected that progress would
continue to be made in the future.' It is noteworthy that the result
here would have been the same under the newer Harris test that
makes statements that are "verifiable only after declared" forward-
looking under the Act.
The court then considered the first part of Boeing's disclosure.
The description of then-current production problems was held to be
outside the statute's definition of forward-looking statements,
despite defendant's argument that these were "assumptions
underlying projections and expectations. 85 Instead the Court held
these were simply "present facts" that, if given safe harbor
protection, "would allow the exception to swallow the rule."86
81. Id. at 1168.
82. Id. at 1168 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Such assumptions are included in the statutory definition of forward-
looking statements. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(i)(1)(E) (quoted in note 18 supra).
86. 40 F. Supp. 2d. at 1169. See also Robertson v. Strassner, 32 F. Supp. 2d
443, 450 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that the statement "other Viosca Knoll
developments are presently progressing on the original construction schedule,"
was an existing fact and not forward-looking under the statutory definition); cf.
Hockey v. Medhekar, No. C96-0815MHP, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS *15-16 (N.D.
Cal., Apr. 14, 1997) (holding that statements dealing with existing facts such as
robust product demand or shifts in product mix are "assumptions underlying or
relating to" statements of future economic performance, and are forward-looking
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Other district court holdings are in accord, refusing to grant
forward-looking statement status to existing or historical facts.87
c. Nondisclosure of Existing Facts is not Forward-
Looking-In a related vein, in cases involving nondisclosure of
material existing facts district courts have also refused to
characterize the statements that are made as forward-looking. For
example, in In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.,88 the company
entered into a high-risk trading relationship with D.E. Shaw & Co.,
a hedge fund. The relationship involved a $1.4 billion unsecured
loan to Shaw, which Shaw was to manage as a separate trading
portfolio, returning 50% of any profits to BankAmerica.89 Initial
corporate disclosures advised investors that the company had
"established a relationship" or a "strategic relationship" with
Shaw.9° A press release referred to the Shaw relationship as a
"financing relationship that did not result in any ownership interest
by either firm in the other,"9' and numerous other disclosures
characterized the relationship simply as "one which would enhance
[the Company's] ability to offer [additional financial] products to its
customers. ,
92
Subsequently, at a September 1998 press conference held in
connection with BankAmerica's merger with NationsBank, the
company's CEO reported that the bank had outstanding loans to
hedge funds in an amount "below $300 million," that it had an
"investment" in Shaw, and that all such loans were secured.9 At
that time, Shaw was experiencing massive losses due to Russia's
August 1998 debt default and its effect on the prices of U.S.
Treasury Bonds. BankAmerica's third quarter earnings release
ultimately disclosed, among other things, that a $372 million charge
off of the Shaw loan would be taken, that $70 million in income
related thereto would be reversed, and that the company would
as defined by the Act).
87. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 2d 354, 375 (D.N.J. 1999)
(holding that the statement that company had discovered potential accounting
irregularities among certain former CUC business units was not a forward-looking
statement under the statute); see also In re Quintel Entertainment Inc. Sec. Litig.,
72 F. Supp. 2d 283, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. Supp. 2d
935, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1999); In re Olympic Fin. Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 97-496, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *13 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1998).





93. BankAmerica, 78 F. Supp. 2d. at 984.
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have to purchase Shaw's $20 billion fixed-income securities
portfolio to avoid more than $175 million in additional losses.9"
Defendants in the case argued that the information regarding
the Shaw losses was forward-looking, in that though the company
knew the extent of the investment in Shaw, the losses from that
investment were not actualized until the decision to take the write
downs was officially made the day before the third quarter earnings
release was issued.95 The court was not persuaded, holding that
information regarding the Shaw losses was not forward-looking at
all, but instead "pre-existing hard facts" that should have been
disclosed.96 Other courts have come to the same conclusion in cases
involving allegations of failure to disclose presently known facts.
9 7
d. Towards Refining the Definition of "Forward-Looking
Statement"-Has a clearer definition of "forward-looking
statement" emerged since the Act was passed? On this interim
point, at least the following appear to be clear from the cases
decided thus far: (1) plans and projections couched in language of
expectation will be treated as forward-looking; (2) regardless of the
use of anticipatory language, undisclosed statements of existing fact
will not be deemed to be forward-looking; (3) despite the tense of
the verbs chosen, statements that generally cannot be verified until
after they are made are forward-looking (4) mixed lists, where an
omission is alleged, will be treated as a unit for purposes of safe
harbor treatment-the list as a whole will either qualify as forward-
looking or not.
2. What Will Qualify as "Meaningful Cautionary Statements"?
-Once it is determined that a disclosure is forward-looking, the
court proceeds then to a consideration of the cautionary language
accompanying it. Under the Act, a written forward-looking state-
ment will be protected only if it is "identified as [such] and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially
from those in the forward-looking statement."9
a. Safe Harbor "Warnings"-Issuers are now in the
practice of including "safe harbor warnings" with their disclosures.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 944, 996-97.
96. Id. at 99 fn.10.
97. See, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D.
Pa. 1998); In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901 (D.N.J. 1998); In re
ValuJet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
98. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (quoted in note 17 supra).
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For example, each of the press releases at issue in Harris contained
the following warning:
Statements made in this press release, including those relating
to ... [list of disclosure topics] ... are forward looking and are
made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Securities
Reform Act of 1995. Such statements involve risks and
uncertainties which may cause results to differ materially from
those set forth in these statements.... In addition to the factors
set forth in this release, . . . [list of specific risk factors] ... could
affect the forward looking statements contained in this press
release. 99
Though the statute provides no guidance as to which
"important factors" must be listed, the legislative history does. The
original House bill required only a recitation that "actual results
could differ" from those predicted in the forward-looking
statement.1°°  By choosing instead to require identification of
important factors, Congress clearly rejected the proposition that a
boilerplate warning would suffice. This comports with existing case
law decided under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. 1' On the other
end of the spectrum, though, Congress rejected an SEC proposal to
require identification of the factors "most likely to cause actual
results to differ," 102 instead adopting the present requirement that
the cautionary language identify only "important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially" from those set forth in the
disclosure.
b. Boilerplate Will Not Suffice-So what will qualify as
"important factors?" The Act's legislative history warns that "the
cautionary statements must convey substantive information about
factors that realistically could cause results to differ... such as
information about the issuer's business." 13  Commentators and
judges alike have postulated that the safe harbor thus codifies or
incorporates the "bespeaks caution" doctrine's requirement'14 that
99. Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1449, 1450-51 (S.D. Fla. 1998). See
also In re PLC Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (noting
that each press release contained the following disclaimer: "Note: Certain of the
above statements may be forward looking statements..
100. Rosen, supra note 29, at 653.
101. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
102. Rosen, supra note 29, at 653.
103. Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 43.
104. See, e.g., John Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding
Road to the PSLRA of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335, 355 (1996) (referring to this prong
of the safe harbor as the "bespeaks caution" prong); Rosen, supra note 29, at 653;
Brodsky, supra note 57; Harris, 998 F. Supp. at 1453 ("This provision was based
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cautionary statements be "substantive and tailored to the specific
future projections, estimates or opinions in the [disclosure
document] which the plaintiffs challenge.
10 5
Accordingly, in In re Computer Associates Sec. Litig.,l°u the
cautionary language consisted of the following statements: (1) that
"there can be no assurances that future results will be achieved,"
and (2) that there were "important factors that could cause actual
results to differ materially." These were held to be general
boilerplate disclaimers and therefore insufficient to bring the
forward-looking statements into the safe harbor'
Similarly in Boeing, where the company had predicted a "near
term decline in productivity," its statements describing the cause of
the company's then-current production problems"~ did nothing to
"warn investors of factors that could cause a steeper decline in the
Company's productivity or an extension of that period of
inefficiency.'0 9  These statements, therefore, were denied safe
harbor protection."0  Likewise, where the projection was that
Boeing would make progress in designing systems to improve
production efficiency and reduce cycle times, the meaningful
cautionary statements offered by defendants spoke to overall
production problems and an expectation that margins would be
lower as a result of the production problems. As Boeing did not
actually identify any factors that would have alerted investors to the
possibility that production efficiency systems might not be
implemented, the necessary meaningful cautionary language was
lacking, and the safe harbor did not apply."'
Conversely in Harris, such factors as "increased competition,"
"the purchasing decisions of existing customers," "the volatile
nature of the generic drug industry itself," "the unpredictability of
the degree and timing of price competition," "the speed of the
restructuring of the [company's] production facilities," "mistaken
upon the judicially-created safe harbor known as the 'bespeaks caution'
doctrine.").
105. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371-72; Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th
Cir. 1994); 17 C.F.R. 230.175 (1997).
106. 75 F. Supp. 2d 68 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
107. Id. at 73. Accord Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495SBA, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *45 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1999) ("[M]erely prefacing
a forward-looking statement with a clause such as 'we expect' or 'we believe' does
not constitute sufficient risk disclosure.").
108. See note 79, supra, and accompanying text quoting the relevant Boeing
disclosure.
109. In re Boeing Sec. Litig., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (D. Wash. 1998).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1169.
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estimates and assumptions concerning customer inventory shelf
stock adjustments," and "other information identified in [the
company's] SEC filings""' 2 were deemed to suffice."' This was true
particularly where these turned out to be the precise factors that led
to IVAX's poorer than expected performance.'
114
c. Actual Factors that Causes Results to Differ Need Not be
Listed-Ideally then, a safe harbor disclaimer will warn of all
known risk factors that are relevant both to the issuer and to the
projections it is making in the given report or press release. But it
is clear from the legislative history of the Act that to be protected,
an issuer need not (in hindsight) have included all factors that
might have materially affected the predictive disclosures."'
According to the Conference Report, "failure to include the
particular factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking
statement not to come true will not mean that the statement is not
protected by the safe harbor.""
6
Case law decided under the PSLRA carries out this
Congressional intent. Harris, for example, dealt squarely with this
issue since it was a fraud by omission case. There, the Eleventh
Circuit posed the following question: "To be 'meaningful' [cit.
omitted] must the cautionary language explicitly mention the factor
that ultimately belies a forward-looking statement?" The answer
was negative: "when an investor has been warned of risks of a
significance similar to that actually realized, she is sufficiently on
notice of the danger of the investment to make an intelligent
decision about it according to her own preferences for risk and
reward.".. 7
d. A Rule of Thumb for Listing Risk Factors?-Because of
the nature of company-specific disclosures, no bright line rule can
ever be stated as to what will constitute meaningful cautionary
language in a particular case. Indeed the notion that the articulated
risk factors must be specifically tailored, and that those listed need
112. The district court pointed out that "Congress was explicit in stating that
meaningful cautionary language could incorporate by reference information
contained in documents filed with the SEC [cit.omittedl." Harris v. Ivax, 998 F.
Supp. 1449, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. "[The PSLRA] does not require a listing of all factors." Harris, 182 F.3d at
807 (emphasis in original). See also Rasheedi v. Cree Research, Inc., supra note
58, at *6 ("Defendants do not have to caution against every conceivable factor that
may cause results to differ.").
116. Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 44.
117. Harris, 182 F.3d at 807.
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only be of similar significance to that actually realized, invites
further litigation and judicial interpretation. What is clear at this
point, however, is that the Act is intended to protect forward-
looking statements so long as the issuer identifies substantial known
risk factors that are specific to its business and that directly and
substantively may affect the disclosed projections.
e. Warning of Existing Facts is not "Cautionary""-Just as
labeling existing facts as "forward-looking" will not garner safe
harbor, likewise including risks that have already matured in the
risk factors or cautionary language section of a safe harbor
disclaimer will not do. It has long been the case that "[t]o warn that
the untoward may occur when the event is contingent is prudent; to
caution that it is only possible for the unfavorable events to happen
when they have already occurred is deceit."' 18  Several PSLRA
cases have used this as a basis for finding that purported cautionary
statements were insufficient to shelter defendants in the Act's safe
harbor."9
f The "Accompanied by" Requirement-Finally, it should
be noted that the text of the PSLRA requires forward-looking
statements to be "accompanied by" 20 a statement of risk factors in
order to be harbored. This raises two questions. First, with regard
to written disclosures, must the cautionary language be contained
within the same document, or can warnings be set forth in other
written disclosures? And second, with regard to oral forward-
looking statements, must the required cautionary language be
recited with each individual projection, or can a blanket disclaimer
be made at the outset of the conference call, speech, or interview?
As to the latter, logic seems behind the holding in Wenger v.
Lumisys, Inc.1' There, the plaintiffs argued that the statutory
language requires each "particular"' oral forward-looking
statement to be identified as such and accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language."l Defendants countered persuasively that to
118. Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 171 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 544 (5th Cir. Unit A, 1981)).
119. See In re Home Health Corp. of Am., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV98-834, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1230, at *30; (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1999) (cautioning investors
against assuming it would continue to contract with its managed care organization
clients, when in fact two such clients had already terminated their lucrative
contracts with issuer). See also In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901,
930 (D.N.J. 1998).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (quoted in note 21, supra).
121. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(2)(A)(i) (quoted in note 33, supra).
123. See Wenger, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(2)(A)).
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require reiteration of risk factors along with each projection in a
single oral presentation would bury projections in "statutory white
noise."' 2' In other words, a defendant making numerous verbal
forward-looking disclosures in a single presentation need only have
given a single safe harbor warning (including reference to those
readily available documents that contain risk factors). The court
agreed, pointing out that the legislative history of the Act
supported its ruling to that effect.'2
With respect to written disclosures, the "accompanied by"
requirementl26 is more thorny. In most Reform Act cases, the
cautionary language appears along with the forward-looking
statements, in the same sentence or paragraph,127 or at least within
the same document." This seems to be in keeping with the tenor of
the statute. And, it has been argued that the determination of
whether a particular disclosure is to be sheltered by the either the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine, the SEC safe harbor rules, or the
bespeaks caution prong of the Act's safe harbor, should be a "four
corners" analysis 9
Nonetheless, at least one district court has considered
cautionary statements made in other documents and incorporated
by reference.1 3 That court's analysis relied heavily, however, on the
124. Id. at 1242.
125. See id. (quoting the Senate Committee Report as saying "in the case of
oral statements, the Committee expects that the notice will be provided at the
outset of any general discussion of future events and that further notice will not be
necessary during the course of that discussion," S. REP. No. 104-98, supra note 6,
at 17; and noting that the House Committee Report had described "the rule
governing oral statements as 'flexible' and no more cumbersome than the rules
governing written forward looking statements." Statement of Managers, supra note
7, at 45-46).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (quoted in note 21, supra). See also id. §
78u-5(e), (directing courts to consider, on any dispositive motion based on written
disclosures that are alleged to fall within the safe harbor, "any statement cited in
the complaint and any cautionary statement accompanying the forward looking
statement, which are [sic] not subject to material dispute, cited by the defendant.")
(emphasis supplied).
127. See, e.g., P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant, Corp. 47 F. Supp. 2d
546, 556 (regarding a press release which indicated that accounting irregularities
had been found at certain CUC business units, cautioned that previously issued
financial statements should not be relied upon, and estimated the amount of
earnings that would need to restated, while alerting investors that the precise
amount thereof was contingent upon the findings of the audit committee).
128. See discussion of safe harbor warnings or disclaimers, supra note 99, and
accompanying text.
129. See Jonathan B. Lurvey, Note, Who is Bespeaking to Whom? Plaintiff
Sophistication, Market Information, and Forward-Looking Statements, 45 DUKE L.
J. 579, 603-04 (1995).
130. See Karacand v. Edwards, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1248-49 (D. Utah 1999)
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"bespeaks caution" doctrine, which was stated to be coextensive
with the statutory safe harbor in the Tenth Circuit. 3'
B. The "Immateriality" Prong
The Reform Act also protects forward-looking statements that
are "immaterial," whether or not they are accompanied by
cautionary language."2 No case decided under the PSLRA to date
has based its holding on that provision of the statute, however.
Instead, the courts seem more comfortable dismissing claims based
on pre- Reform Act law to the effect that "vague hyperbolic
statements" are nothing but "puffery," and therefore immaterial,
the type of statements upon which no reasonable investor would or
should rely.'33
1. Vague Forward-Looking Statements of Corporate Optimism
-Typical of this approach is In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig.'
14
There, the court identified the following, inter alia, as forward-
looking statements: "we think over time, the Stratosphere will
become the symbol of Las Vegas," "there's going to be a line from
the day we open for a long, long time," and "with the addition of
1,000 hotel rooms... opening of the retail shops... as well as
additional marketing... we believe visitation to the facility should
increase and overall operating results should improve.'
35
Describing these statements as "soft or puffing,', 36 the court
(discussing a safe harbor warning contained in press release that listed some risk
factors and then referred reader to issuer's SEC filing.). See also EP Medsystems,
Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 726, 760-767 (D.N.J. 1998).
131. See Karacand, 53 F. Supp. at 1248-49. For a discussion of the precise status
of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine in that circuit., see generally Jonathan L. Booze,
Comment: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of the Bespeaks Caution
Doctrine to Forward-Looking Statements, 47 KAN. L. REV. 495 (1999).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii) (quoted in note 21, supra). For a
possible explanation of the legislative history of this portion of the Act, see Coffee,
supra note 60, at 991.
133. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427-28
(3rd Cir. 1997) (finding vague and therefore immaterial "a general, nonspecific
state-ment of optimism or hope that a trend will continue"); San Leandro
Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 811
(2d Cir. 1996) (declaring statements that issuer was "optimistic" about earnings
and "expected" good sales were "puffery"); Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964
F.2d 272, 283 n.12 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934, (1992) (finding the statement
"United Jersey looks to the future with great optimism" to be "inactionable
puffing").
134. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Nev. 1999).
135. Id. at 1199.
136. Id. at 1198.
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dismissed the fraud claims based on them without reference to the
"immateriality" prong of the safe harbor.137
2. Specific Forward-Looking Statements Expressing Optimism
-Besides vague statements of corporate optimism, other cases
have found other specific (not vague, puffing) forward-looking
statements to be immaterial as a matter of law, and thus also not
actionable. For example, the projection "we could have another
surprise [referring to component problems encountered in the
past], we don't expect any in the [upcoming] quarter" was held to
be immaterial'38 and therefore could not support a claim for
securities fraud. That court aptly noted that "'surprises' by
definition, are unexpected, and the statement is therefore
meaningless and immaterial.' ' 139 This makes good sense, and like
the pre-Reform Act puffery cases, it leads to the conclusion that no
investor would or should have relied on it.
3. Other Immaterial Statements-In another PSLRA case, a
sales projection of $25 million and earnings per share estimate of
$.55 were held to be nonactionable where the actual sales were
$23,002,000, and the actual EPS figure was $.50, the difference being
immaterial, thus disabling any fraud claims based on these
projections.' This type of projection is immaterial not in the sense
that it precludes reliance, but in the sense that the statement turns
out to be essentially true. While this use of immateriality is slightly
different than the usual finding that a statement is too vague to
justify reliance by an investor, it too appears to fit within the Act's
"immateriality" prong.
It is posited that the little-used PSLRA "immateriality" prong
merely codifies and incorporates pre-Reform Act "puffery" law, as
it applies to projections and other forward-looking statements.
Indeed, the Conference Committee seemed to indicate so in
allowing that "[c]ourts may continue to find a forward-looking
137. See id. at 1199. See also, e.g., Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231,
1245-46 (holding "we're the leader in a rapidly growing market," and
"fundamentally, we're just a good company, we know our markets well, we
dominate these markets, we have good people, a good management team, and
we're positioned to move forward now" to be inactionable as "immaterial," but
without citation to the Act). For other PSLRA cases that implicitly use the
"immateriality" prong of the PSLRA's safe harbor, see In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 539; Buck v. Piercing Pagoda, Inc., No. 98-5535, 1999 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 16092, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 1999); Copperstone, supra note 107, at *39-
40; In re PLC Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D.Mass. 1999).
138. Karacand, 53 F. Supp. at 1252.
139. Id.
140. See Wenger, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
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statement immaterial - and thus not actionable under the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act - on other grounds.' 41
D. The "Actual Knowledge" Prong
If a disclosure is not identified as forward-looking, or it is not
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements (i.e. it fails to
conform to the "bespeaks caution" prong of the Act) and/or if the
disclosure is not held to be immaterial under the "immateriality
prong" of the Act, it can still achieve safe harbor if the plaintiff fails
to prove that the statement "was made with actual knowledge" of
the falsity of the statement or its misleading nature.' 2 In the case of
a statement made by a corporate officer or other representative, the
plaintiff must prove "actual knowledge" by the speaker.' 3 In the
case of such a statement issued by the issuer as an entity, the
plaintiff would have to prove that the statement was approved by
an executive officer of the entity and that that approval was given
with "actual knowledge" that the statement was false or
misleading."
While an in-depth discussion of the "actual knowledge" prong
of the safe harbor is beyond the scope of this article, a brief
discussion of the only post-Reform Act circuit court opinion
addressing this part of the statute is appropriate. In the case of In
Re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation'5 the company, a leading
issuer of credit cards, sustained a $20 million first quarter loss in
1997, allegedly caused by the adoption of new policies that resulted
in many more high risk customers and consequently excessive
charged-off accounts.' Plaintiffs, former shareholders of Advanta,
charged that the company failed to disclose these risky practices
even after it became clear that large losses were their inevitable
result. And according to the complaint, through various officers
Advanta simultaneously made several false or materially
misleading statements. 147
Specifically, the Advanta plaintiffs focused on a statement
made by company Vice President for Investor Relations, Janet
Point, to the Dow Jones News Service about the company's plans to
convert existing accounts at "teaser" interest rates to the usual
141. Statement of Managers, supra note 7, at 44 (emphasis added).
142. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (quoted in note 31, supra).
143. Id. §78u-5(c)(1)(B)(ii) (quoted in note 31, supra).
144. Id.
145. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
146. See id. at 528.
147. See id.
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higher rates, and the effect on revenues of this conversion." Since
Point's statement was neither identified as a forward-looking
statement nor accompanied by any cautionary language, it could
not find safe harbor under the "bespeaks caution" prong of the
PSLRA. Neither was there any argument that her statement was
immaterial so as to be exempt under prong two. Consequently, the
defendants argued the "actual knowledge" prong of the Act
safeguarded the statement. 149
In applying the PSLRA, the Third Circuit scrutinized plaintiff's
allegations regarding alleged "actual knowledge." Plaintiff's logic
was as follows: in an article published six months later, Advanta's
CEO admitted that Advanta did not increase its rates to as high as
Point had said the company would, and that since Point was a
company representative, she must have known the company would
not re-price at the level she had projected.' No specific facts were
pled to support the necessary inference that Point or anyone at
Advanta knew when Point spoke to Dow Jones that the company
would not re-price its credit card accounts as high as originally
planned."' Under these circumstances, the court found that Point's
statement was protected by the Act's safe harbor.'52
Some district court opinions based on the "actual knowledge"
prong are similar to the Third Circuit's Advanta. 3 But in others,
the use of the "actual knowledge" prong to dismiss claims is
somewhat implicit or the opinion is devoid of analysis.5 And in
148. Point was quoted in the September 12, 1996 Dow Jones article as follows:
"Over the next six months Advanta will experience a large increase in revenues as
it converts more than $5 billion in accounts that are now at teaser rates of about
7% to its normal interest rate of about 17%." Id. at 536. This was held to be a
forward-looking statement for purposes of the Act. See notes 74-76 supra, and
accompanying text.
149. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97CV-4343, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10189, at *28-29 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1998).
150. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 536.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 537. It is noteworthy that the court found the later news article
not inconsistent with Point's statement, i.e. Advanta may have intended to do just
as Point anticipated, but later changed its strategy. The court described this as at
best an "unwise business decision[ ]." Id.
153. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 2d 354, 374-76 (D.N.J. 1999)
(reviewing specific factual allegations and determining that plaintiffs have
adequately alleged "actual knowledge"); Kensington Capital Management v.
Oakley, Inc., No. SA CV 97-808-GLT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *9-11(C.D.
Cal., Jan. 14, 1999) (actual knowledge adequately plead); Clark v. TRO Learning,
Inc., No. 97 C 8683, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7989, at *16-18 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 1998)
(actual knowledge inadequately plead).
154. See Ruskin v. TIG Holdings, Inc., No. 98 CIV 1068, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14860, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 1999); Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Cocur
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most cases the determination is heavily intertwined with the courts'
analysis of the heightened pleading requirements established by the
Act.1
55
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
There is no question that the protections of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act are potent. The statute, as
supplemented by its expansive legislative history, provides
corporate America and the courts with an effective tool with which
to combat meritless, abusive securities fraud suits. In response,
securities issuers have begun to disseminate carefully drafted "safe
harbor warnings" or "disclaimers" along with their external
statements. These disclosures and the safe harbor warnings
themselves improve the quantity and quality of information
available to the investing public.
Issuers who disseminate truthful information have always been
protected by the securities laws. Treatment of predictive
information, however, has been more troublesome. The PSLRA
safe harbor for forward-looking statements is designed to
encourage predictive disclosures. The "bespeaks caution" prong of
the Act, along with what has been learned from judicial
interpretation of it thus far, provides a simple formula for issuer
protection when making public its plans, forecasts, and projections.
To be sheltered from liability for forward-looking disclosures,
an issuer should follow these guidelines. First, written projections
should always be clearly labeled as "forward-looking statements."
These should be actual predictions, forecasts, or projections, which
may be coupled with their underlying factual assumptions.
Whether or not they are couched in language of expectation,
descriptions of existing facts that are false when made will not be
harbored, under either the Act or pre-existing law.
Merely phrasing forward-looking statements in doubtful or
anticipatory language will not suffice under the safe harbor.
Instead, as to each area of forward-looking information provided,
specific cautionary language should be set forth, in the form of risk
factors that are company-specific and which relate directly to the
forward-looking statements that are being made. While every
effort should be made to identify all known significant risk factors
D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359-60 (D. Colo. 1998); Hockey, supra
note 86, at *21 and *27.
155. See, e.g., Home Health, supra note 119, at *28-29; EP Medsystems Inc. v.
Echocath, Inc. 30 F. Supp. 2d 726, 761 (D.N.J. 1998).
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that might cause the results of the prediction to vary materially
from the forward-looking statement, caution should be exercised
not to bury necessary and relevant information in legalese.
Purported risk factors warning of the possibility of untoward facts
that have already occurred will not be sheltered.
Finally, the risk factors should be set forth in the same
document as the forward-looking statements. The efficacy of the
practice of (in a written safe harbor disclaimer) referring to
extrinsic documents containing risk factors is still unsettled under
PSLRA case law, and it may result in the loss of safe harbor
protection.
Verbal disclosures should commence with a safe harbor
warning that identifies the disclosure areas that are forward-
looking. It then should refer listeners to readily available written
reports, filings or other disclosures that contain specific explicit risk
factors, as outlined above. Such a warning need not be given more
than once in the context of a single oral presentation.
The second or "immateriality" prong of the Act provides
courts with a catchall that incorporates freestanding pre-Reform
Act law regarding "puffery." Vague forward-looking statements
that express corporate optimism will be protected under this prong.
Likewise, the "actual knowledge" prong should provide issuers with
some comfort. If any of the above requirements for safe harbor has
inadvertently been omitted, in the event of a suit based on
unprotected forward-looking statements, the plaintiff will have to
prove actual knowledge of falsity on the part of the issuer or its
representative making a given disclosure. With the advent of the
heightened pleading requirements for scienter, this is increasingly
difficult in the spurious cases, as it should be.
To date, the courts have relied upon an amalgam of pre-
Reform law and the PSLRA in deciding cases involving alleged
securities fraud as it relates to disclosures of forward-looking
information. It is suggested that within its sphere of application,
uniform employment of the Act will further Congress's intent, and
will provide additional certainty for future plaintiffs and issuers
alike.
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